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Turning the Endangered Species Act
Inside Out?
Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003); GDF Realty
Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003).
Within a week, both the Fifth and D.C. Circuits upheld the takings
prohibitions of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973,1 as applied to
species found only in single states, against Commerce Clause challenges.
2
Both cases reach the same result, but the legal analysis used to get there
could hardly be more different. In GDF Realty, the Fifth Circuit found the
requisite "substantial impact" on commerce by treating the species
themselves as commodities and aggregating the economic impact of all
endangered species "takings." The D.C. Circuit, by contrast, held in Rancho
Viejo that the true object of ESA regulation is not endangered species, but
the commercial development that threatens them, which plainly falls within
Congress's powers to regulate under the Commerce Clause. The two courts
saved the threatened arroyo toads3 and subterranean invertebrates, 4 but they
read the Endangered Species Act as if it were two different statutes.
This curious divergence can only be understood in light of the unsettled
state of Commerce Clause jurisprudence following United States v. Lopez5
and United States v. Morrison.6 Those two decisions upended fifty years of
conventional wisdom about the limits on Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause-namely, that there were effectively none 7-and left
lower courts with an uncertain new framework to apply. Of the two cases
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
2. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003); GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v.
Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003).
3. The toads live in scattered populations within California and northwestern Mexico. See
Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1065.
4. The six threatened species, all found only in Texas, are insects and arachnids, most of them
eyeless, and all less than a centimeter in length. See GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 625. The GDF
Realty court referred to them collectively as the "Cave Species." See id.
5. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
6. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
7. Deborah Merritt memorably characterized the pre-Lopez Commerce Clause as "an
intellectual joke." Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 691 (1995).
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considered here, Rancho Viejo represents the abler attempt to square the
ESA with the new Commerce Clause doctrine, because its analysis is more
objective than GDF Realty's and more clearly satisfies the strictures of
Lopez and Morrison. But like GDF Realty, Rancho Viejo must present the
ESA's impact on commerce, which is peripheral in the statutory design, as
the Act's core object-must turn the ESA "inside out," so to speak-in
order to justify it under the Commerce Clause. This cramped conception of
the statute does not convincingly justify all of its applications. The
shortcomings of Rancho Viejo do not represent sloppiness on the part of the
D.C. Circuit, however. Instead, they reflect the failure of the Lopez and
Morrison framework to meet the Supreme Court's stated aspiration to
distinguish "between what is truly national and what is truly local."8
I
The story starts with Lopez and Morrison. In 1995, the Lopez Court
invalidated a federal statute on Commerce Clause grounds for the first time
in over fifty years. The Court gave four reasons for flunking the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990:9 The activity it regulated-gun possession-
was not economic activity, the statute lacked a jurisdictional element, there
were no legislative findings regarding interstate commerce effects, and the
impact of the regulated activity on interstate commerce was not substantial.
The opinion failed, however, to explain how these four factors were
weighted and which were decisive. 10 Morrison, which struck down part of
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 five years later, I only muddied
the waters further. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion repeated but did not
clarify the factors from Lopez and discounted the detailed congressional
findings that gender-motivated violence impairs interstate commerce.12
Lopez and Morrison thus not only circumscribed the scope of Congress's
lawmaking authority, but also blurred its borders.
The Endangered Species Act was one of the many statutes left
vulnerable to constitutional challenge under- the new Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. First enacted in 1973, the ESA "represented the most
comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever
enacted by any nation."1 3 The ESA was equipped with two powerful
8. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2000).
10. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253, 1258
(2003).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 13,981.
12. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
13. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
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provisions: section 7,14 which bars federal agencies from harming a species
listed as endangered by the Secretary of the Interior; and section 9,15 which
prohibits the taking of endangered species.' 6 The ESA represented a
national solution to a national problem.' 7 On its face, though, the Act
seemed to have no more connection to interstate commerce than the statutes
struck down in Lopez and Morrison, and some commentators feared for its
survival under the new Commerce Clause jurisprudence.' 8
II
The Fifth and D.C. Circuits both struggled to justify the Endangered
Species Act within the Lopez and Morrison framework. The Fifth Circuit
looked hard for a commercial angle to the ESA and found one in the
endangered species themselves. Judge Barksdale asserted that the "ESA's
protection of species is economic in nature,"' 19 and he noted the potential
commercial value of endangered species' genetic resources and the
opportunity for renewed trade in regenerated species as examples of the
economic effects of species preservation. 20 Though he acknowledged that
the species in question have no commercial value at present, he stated that
their protection is essential to the ESA's larger regulatory program.21 He
concluded that because the aggregated takings regulated by the Act
substantially affect interstate commerce, the Act is a permissible exercise of
22Congress's power.
14. 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
15. Id. § 1538.
16. What exactly it means to "take" a species has itself been the subject of debate, and it is a
question that bears on the Commerce Clause issue, as is shown below. See infra notes 37-38 and
accompanying text. The statute itself defines "take" to mean "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." Id. § 1532(19).
In 1975, the Interior Department issued a regulation interpreting "harm" to include in certain
circumstances habitat modification and degradation, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2003), and the Supreme
Court upheld this interpretation as within the Secretary's discretion in Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
17. See Jamie Y. Tanabe, Comment, The Commerce Clause Pendulum: Will Federal
Environmental Law Survive in the Post-SWANCC Epoch of "New Federalism"?, 31 ENVTL. L.
1051, 1055 (2001) (noting that federal environmental regulation emerged in response to the states'
inability to protect natural resources and address transboundary problems effectively).
18. See, e.g., Maya R. Moiseyev, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers: The Clean Water Act Bypasses a Commerce Clause Challenge,
but Can the Endangered Species Act?, 7 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 191, 193
(2001).
19. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 639 (5th Cir. 2003).
20. See id. at 632, 639.
21. Id. at 640-41.
22. In insisting on characterizing the ESA as economic regulation, the GDF Realty court
seemed to be responding to a brief passage in Lopez:
[The challenged provision of the Gun-Free School Zones Act] is not an essential part of
a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained
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The D.C. Circuit in Rancho Viejo took a very different approach.23 The
court posited as the object of the ESA the 280-home residential
development it blocked, not the threatened species it protected. In Judge
Garland's phrase, "the ESA regulates takings, not toads.''24 The court
distinguished the situation from Lopez and Morrison, in which "'neither the
actors nor their conduct ha[d] a commercial character, and neither the
purposes nor the design of the statute ha[d] an evident commercial
nexus.' ' 25 Not only was the affected activity here clearly commercial, but
the court also argued that the design of the statute more generally related to
commerce, as Congress had contemplated protecting endangered species by
regulating the development of land.26
Having justified the ESA as a regulation of commercial development,
the court went on to suggest that the mantle of constitutionality extends also
to cover the statute's prohibition of noncommercial takings (for example,
by a hiker in the woods). Quoting Lopez, the court asserted that "'where a
general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de
minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no
consequence."''27 But as this question was not before the court, Judge
Garland declined to answer it conclusively. 28 Chief Judge Ginsburg was
unwilling to go even this far, and wrote separately in a concurrence that the
ESA can reach only those takings that substantially affect interstate
commerce.
29
under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected
with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995), discussed in GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 630. The
court evidently concluded that the logical inverse must be true: that interstate takings prohibitions
can be sustained if conceived as necessary to "a larger regulation of economic activity." See, e.g.,
GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 640 ("ESA is an economic regulatory scheme; the regulation of intrastate
takes of the Cave Species is an essential part of it. Therefore, Cave Species takes may be
aggregated with all other ESA takes."). The bulk of the opinion is spent attempting to maneuver
the ESA into this perceived safe harbor.
23. The court held that the case was governed by its prior decision in National Ass 'n of Home
Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), but the court picked up on one rationale
offered by that earlier panel-in Judge Henderson's concurrence-and made it the basis of the
opinion. See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Nat'l
Ass 'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1058 (Henderson, J.., concurring)).
24. 323 F.3d at 1072. Judge Garland continued: "That regulated activity is Rancho Viejo's
planned commercial development, not the arroyo toad that it threatens. The ESA does not purport
to tell toads what they may or may not do." Id.
25. Id. (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000)) (alterations in original).
26. See id. at 1072-73.
27. Id. at 1077 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558).
28. See id.
29. See id. at 1080 (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring).
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III
Both GDF Realty and Rancho Viejo are notable for their creativity, but
only Rancho Viejo is equal to the task of beating back the challenge to the
ESA. GDF Realty suffers from several serious defects. First, the court
chose a method of Commerce Clause analysis-aggregating the effects of
noneconomic activity-that the Supreme Court all but invalidated in
Morrison.30 Second, the analysis was so speculative and vague that it could
in principle justify nearly any congressional enactment. If Commerce
Clause analysis were a matter of imagining whether a statute could
hypothetically generate some economic value that might not exist absent
the statute, it is hard to imagine any law that would fail the test. Certainly
the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the Violence Against Women Act
would pass, since improving safety reasonably might be thought to
facilitate commercial activity.3' The Supreme Court is unlikely, however, to
endorse any Commerce Clause formula that would undo the results of
Lopez and Morrison.
Third, the Fifth Circuit's approach relied heavily on claims about
Congress's motive for passing the ESA that are hard to substantiate. The
court committed itself to justifying the ESA as economic regulation and to
treating species as the object of regulation. Since the species in the case
were not in any obvious way commercial objects, the court found it
necessary to argue that Congress chose to regulate them for commercial
ends. To do so, the court plunged into the legislative history of the Act and
emerged brandishing a few sentences as evidence that Congress passed the
ESA to enable the future commercial exploitation of protected species.32
30. The Morrison Court stated that "[w]hile we need not adopt a categorical rule against
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our
Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only
where that activity is economic in nature." 529 U.S. at 613. Perhaps seeking a way around this
language, the Fifth Circuit aggregated Cave Species takings together with all takings of
endangered species, most of which are not confined to a single state. This move is unconvincing,
though, as it has no precedent in Supreme Court case law, and it fails to introduce an economic
element to the regulation. Cf Jason Everett Goldberg, Comment, Substantial Activity and Non-
Economic Commerce: Toward a New Theory of the Commerce Clause, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 563, 571
(2001) (arguing that Morrison "seemingly differentiates between economic and non-economic
activity and will not allow regulation of the latter even though there may be a rational basis to
conclude that the activity substantially affects interstate commerce").
3 1. Indeed, the legislative history for the Violence Against Women Act contained findings to
that effect. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801,
1853-54.
32. See GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 632 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that
"[genetic variations] are potential resources" (quoting ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES
CONSERVATION ACT OF 1973, H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 5 (1973)) (alteration in original)). Not
finding much support for the "species as resources" view in the record, the court later cited the
legislative history of a different law, the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969. See id. at
639 (citing S. REP. No. 91-526, at 1415 (1969)).
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Courts are usually suspicious of arguments about congressional intent that
are grounded solely in legislative history, given the manipulability of the
legislative record and the dubious precedential value of legislators'
unenacted statements.33 The Fifth Circuit's arguments are especially
suspect, as the court purported to divine not only how Congress intended
the ESA to apply, but also the ultimate ends for which Congress wanted
species protected.
Finally, to justify the ESA, the Fifth Circuit twisted its meaning,
making its master narrative a story about economics. But the ESA is not
about monetizing endangered species; it is about preserving them in their
natural state. This characterization is not grounded in legislative history, but
in the text and design of the statute. All the provisions of the Act are
directed to the preservation of species without regard to their commercial
possibilities.34 GDF Realty further speculates about why Congress would
want to preserve species, but its answer is out of step with the design of the
Act, which makes no reference to commercial ends. To analyze the ESA
under the Commerce Clause by adding up what endangered species would
fetch on the market is perverse, because the Act exists to protect threatened
species from exploitation.
By comparison, Rancho Viejo offers a more promising approach to
squaring the Endangered Species Act with Lopez and Morrison. By
focusing on the residential development blocked by the statute, rather than
the hypothetical market value of species, Rancho Viejo avoids GDF
Realty's flight into speculation. The court hits on a Commerce Clause
formula that is much easier to administer by pegging the Commerce Clause
inquiry to something objective: the activity triggering the takings
prohibition. Also, the Rancho Viejo approach stays on the good side of
33. For the classic contemporary critique of legislative history's use in statutory
interpretation, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW (1997). While most judges would not agree with Justice Scalia's categorical rule against
consulting legislative history, they are hesitant to accept claims about legislative intent drawn
solely from the legislative record. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 345-53 (1990).
34. See, e.g., ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE,
LAW, AND SOCIETY 674 (2d ed. 1998) (observing that the ESA "made no distinction between
species that have a commercial value or direct human utility and those that do not" but "gave legal
value to an abstraction"). The ESA's preamble makes the noncommercial nature of this purpose
clear: "The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, [and] to provide a program
for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species .... 1 6 U.S.C. § 1531(b)
(2000). One of the Act's sponsors, Senator Harrison Williams, observed: "'Most animals are
worth very little in terms of dollars and cents. However, their esthetic value is great indeed. The
pleasure of simply observing them... is unmeasurable."' Shannon Petersen, Comment, Congress
and Charismatic Megafauna: A Legislative History of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L.
463, 479 (1999) (quoting 119 CONG. REC. 25,693 (1973) (statement of Sen. Williams)); see also
id. at 467 ("[M]ost in Congress believed the Act to be a largely symbolic effort to protect
charismatic megafauna representative of our national heritage, like bald eagles, bison, and grizzly
bears.").
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Morrison by not looking for a substantial economic impact in the
aggregation of noneconomic, intrastate activities. On the whole, Rancho
Viejo has the virtues of clarity, objectivity, and consistency with the dictates
of Lopez and Morrison.
At the same time, Rancho Viejo has problems of its own. The ESA is
not a regulation of commercial development qua commercial development:
It is a regulation of anything and everything that would take an endangered
species. In fact, GDF Realty makes this very point in rejecting the analysis
Rancho Viejo adopts: "True, the effect of regulation of ESA takes may be
to prohibit such development in some circumstances. But, Congress,
through ESA, is not directly regulating commercial development. 3 5 It
misrepresents the statute to argue that it is essentially a regulation of
commercial development, and that noncommercial activities subject to it
are only "individual instances" of "de minimis character." 36 The text of the
statute proves the point: Of the ten meanings given for "take" in the statute,
at least seven are most strongly associated with the activities of
outdoorsmen.37 It seems that the lone hunter, not the bulldozer, is the
prototypical "taker," at least from the perspective of statutory design.38 The
ESA's regulation of interstate commerce is merely circumstantial: The
statute regulates commerce when that happens to be what threatens
endangered species.
Thus, while Rancho Viejo is on solid ground when it upholds the ESA
as applied to commercial activities that threaten species, the broader claim
that it is justified in all its applications rests on a dubious characterization of
the statute. Chief Judge Ginsburg's more modest position-that the takings
prohibition is permissible insofar as the threat comes from activities with a
substantial effect on interstate commerce-is easier to justify under Lopez
and Morrison. But even if this position satisfies Lopez and Morrison, it is
unsatisfactory as a matter of policy. Judge Garland is right that "the ESA
35. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 634.
36. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The court relied on
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995), and Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17
(198 1), for the proposition that not every facet of a statute must be related to commerce if the
statute as a whole is.
37. Those seven meanings are "pursue," "hunt," "shoot," "wound," "kill," "trap," and
"capture." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). For the complete list of meanings, see supra note 16. This list
reflects Congress's understanding of the nature of the threats to species; the ESA's Senate
sponsor, Senator Williams, "stated that overhunting was 'undoubtedly' the 'major reason' for
species extinction." Petersen, supra note 34, at 482 (quoting Endangered Species Act of 1973:
Hearings on S. 1592 and S. 1983 Before the Subcomm. on Env't of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 93d Cong. 114 (1973) (statement of Sen. Williams)).
38. According to Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton, most of the activities that currently
run afoul of the ESA's takings prohibition are commercial or economic in nature. See Rancho
Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1078. Even if this is true, it does not justify treating development as the core
object of the ESA, because that is a question that must be answered with reference to the statute's
design, not its pattern of enforcement.
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represents a national response to a specific problem of 'truly national'
concern," 39 and that limiting its scope to takings that are commercial in
nature would undermine it. Because species are interdependent and their
habitats stretch across state lines, a program of species preservation needs
to be comprehensive and national in scope to be effective.4 ° It is arbitrary to
protect endangered plants or animals if they are threatened by construction
of a shopping center, but not by a homeowner putting in a pond, and to
apply the statute in this patchwork manner would hobble the ESA and
trivialize its purposes.
Ultimately, the problems with Rancho Viejo can be laid at the feet of
Lopez and Morrison. In order to square the Endangered Species Act with
those cases, the D.C. Circuit was forced to foreground the Act's impact on
commerce, even though this impact is only incidental to the statute's
design. But this treatment of the ESA as economic regulation is not really
convincing, and the Act's application to noncommercial takings rests on
shaky ground. Before Lopez and Morrison, courts had only to show a
substantial impact on commerce to justify statutes. To do the same now
they must search for some economic nexus, however peripheral, and
present it as the statute's core concern. The harm here is not only that some
statutes may be struck down, but also that courts cannot uphold their
responsibility to say what the law is when their statutory interpretations
stretch credulity.
Lopez and Morrison hit on an important truth: The Commerce Clause
must impose some limits on Congress's power to legislate. Despite the best
efforts of the D.C. Circuit, however, the Endangered Species Act-a
national solution to a national problem-finds only unsteady support in the
Supreme Court's new Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The Commerce
Clause must mean something-but GDF Realty and Rancho Viejo show
why Lopez and Morrison are poor guides to its meaning.
-Jud Mathews
39. Id. at 1078-79.
40. See ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES CONSERVATION ACT OF 1973, H.R. REP.
No. 93-412, at 7 (1973) (noting that "protection of endangered species is not a matter that can be
handled in the absence of coherent national and international policies: the result of a series of
unconnected and disorganized policies and programs by various states might well be confusion
compounded").
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